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Public	  concern	  about	  the	  safety	  of	  many	  forms	  of	  industrial	  technology	  are	  known	  to	  be	  linked	  to	  a	  
range	  of	  factors	   including	  a	  perceived	  lack	  of	  confidence	  in	  regulatory	  decision	  making.1	  The	  use	  of	  
transgenic	  plants	  in	  agriculture	  may	  be	  seen	  as	  an	  issue	  that	  could	  generate	  similar	  concern.	  Criticism	  
has	   been	  made	   about	   the	   completeness	   of	   knowledge	   on	   the	   potential	   for	   aberrant	   behaviour	   of	  
genetically	  manipulated	  organisms	   (GMO's)	   in	   release	   environments,	   and	   the	   adequacy	   of	   existing	  
pre-­‐release	  screening	  and	  assessment	  methodologies	  (Goldberg	  &	  Tjaden,	  1990).	  Such	  comments	  are	  
important	   because	   any	   perceived	   shortcomings	   in	   the	   pre-­‐release	   assessment	   of	  GMO	   safety	  may	  
lead	  to	  decreased	  public	  support	  of	  the	  technology	  -­‐and	  the	  industry	  itself.	  	  
	  
Because	   impacts	   are	   possible	   at	   various	   levels	   of	   environmental	   organisation,	   effective	   regulatory	  
screening	  methods	  must	   be	   able	   to	   gauge	   direct	   and	   in-­‐direct	   consequences	   of	   the	   application	   of	  
gene	   technology	   over	   time	   and	   space.	   Thus	   a	   range	   of	   viable	   and	  measurable	   impact	   ‘endpoint’s’	  
sensitive	  to	  these	  dimensions	  is	  important	  (Bartell,	  Gardner	  &	  O'Neill,	  (1992:2).	  	  
	  
Pre-­‐release	   screening	   methodologies	   for	   GMO's	   must	   go	   beyond	   traditional	   notions	   of	   impact	  
assessment	   where	   often	   only	   outcomes	   of	   a	   known	   or	   expected	   type	   are	   investigated,	   to	   apply	  
methods	   of	   risk	   analysis.	   Risk-­‐based	   approaches	   involve	   a	   broader	   theoretical	   scope	   over	   which	  
impacts	   could	   occur	   (Duinker	   1989:114).	   Such	   approaches	   are	   ideally	   suited	   to	   the	   uncertainties	  
inherent	   in	   the	   use	   of	   biotechnology	   where	   unexpected	   impacts	   may	   occur	   within	   a	   number	   of	  
environmental	  compartments	  with	  wide	  variation	  in	  magnitude	  (Bartell,	  Gardner	  &	  O'Neill,	  (1992:3).	  
It	   is	   this	   ubiquitous	   uncertainty	   that	   should	  make	   the	  use	   of	   risk	   analysis	  mandatory	   in	   regulatory	  
activities.	  	  
	  
A	  process	  seeking	  to	  effectively	  regulate	  the	  safety	  of	  a	  technology	  should,	  ideally,	   investigate	  both	  
the	  possible	  negative	   impact(s)	  and	  the	  contexts	  within	  which	  they	  might	  occur.	  Figure	  1	  defines	  a	  
relationship	  between	  the	  impact	  of	  a	  technology	  and	  the	  context(s)	  in	  which	  the	  impact	  can	  occur.	  A	  
goal	  of	  effective	   regulation	   should	  be	   to	  minimise	   the	  outcomes	   shown	   in	   segment	  3	  and	  4,	  while	  
maximising	  the	  likelihood	  of	  achieving	  those	  in	  segments	  1	  and	  2.	  	  	  
	  
Such	  goals	  can	  be	  achieved	  by	  assuring	  the	  quality	  of	  the	  regulatory	  decisions	  and	  by	  evaluating	  the	  
processes	   of	   decision-­‐making	   in	   relation	   to	   specific	   set	   criteria.	   The	   likelihood	   of	   achieving	   these	  
goals	   is	  also	   increased	  by	  ensuring	   that	   the	   information	  used	   in	   the	  decision	  making	  process	   is	   the	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Figure	  1:	   Impact	  of	  a	  Technology	  based	  on	  Context	  of	  Consequences	  
(Source:	  Barnes:	  1994b)	  
	  
	  

















A	  Framework	  for	  the	  Pre-­‐release	  Screening	  of	  GMO's	  	  
	  
The	   approach	   to	   Ecological	   Risk	   Analysis	   presented	   here	   is	   designed	   to	   support	   the	   contextual	  
appraisal	  of	  impacts	  resulting	  from	  the	  application	  of	  a	  technology.	  It	  entails	  the	  use	  of	  a	  framework	  
for	   making	   decisions	   about	   the	   management	   of	   risk.2	   Integral	   to	   the	   framework	   is	   an	   auditing	  
template	   that	   defines	   specific	   analytical	   phases	   (See	   Figure	   2).	   The	   template	   applies	   precise	  
terminology	  differentiating	  between	  hazard,	  risk	  and	  impact.3	  	  	  	  
	  
Figure	  2:	   Schematic	  of	  a	  Hazard	  &	  Risk	  Auditing	  Template	  















This	  distinction	  avoids	  the	  confusion	  of	  many	  of	  the	  early	  models	  of	  'risk	  assessment'	  that	  are	  often	  
misapplied	   the	   concepts	   of	   hazard	   and	   risk,	   by	   overlooking	   the	   need	   to	   have	   identified	   a	   hazard	  
before	  attaching	  an	  estimate	  of	  the	  likelihood	  of	  an	  impact	  (ie.	  a	  measure	  of	  risk)	  that	  might	  result	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- Parasitic	  vaccines	  




	  Technological	  Surprise	  
	  	  
Generally	  constrained	  Impacts:	  
- Pesticide	  residues	  in	  food	  
- Algal	  blooms	  
- Unexpected	  behaviour	  of	  a	  GMO	  
Techno-­‐Contextual	  
Surprise	  	  
Emergent	  impacts	  of	  technology	  in	  
a	  regional	  or	  global	  context:	  
- Global	  warming	  




Limited	   Dispersed	  
Planned	  
Emergent	  







Paper delivered at the ANZAAS '95 Congress, Newcastle 




 ©  1995  P.H. Barnes & K. Hulsman   
  - 3 - 
The	   risk	   management	   function	   embodied	   in	   the	   'auditing	   template'	   allows	   iterative	   cycles	   of	  
assessment	   that	   are	   well	   suited	   to	   the	   anticipation	   of	   impacts	   on	   human	   health	   and	   the	   wider	  
environment.	  
	  
The	   complete	   Risk	  Management	  Decision	  Making	   Framework	   (RMDM),	   (incorporating	   the	   auditing	  
template),	  is	  shown	  in	  Table	  1.	  Four	  unique	  elements	  are	  incorporated	  within	  it:	  	  
	  
(1)	   The	  definition	  of	  specific	  decision	  processes	  and	  subsequent	  regulatory	  outcomes	  
thus	   allowing	   the	   formation	   of	   a	   transparent	   audit	   trail	   of	   decisions	   and	   the	  
criteria	  on	  which	  they	  were	  based.5	  
	  
(2)	   The	  requirement	  for	  risk	  analysis	  to	  carried	  out	  by	  a	  team	  of	  assessors	  reflecting	  
both	  the	  basic	  sciences	  inherent	  in	  technique	  and	  the	  interdisciplinary	  sciences	  of	  
impact	  thus	  ensuring	  that	  adequate	  rigour	  is	  brought	  to	  bear	  on	  the	  uncertainties	  
of	  the	  assessment	  process.6	  
	  
(3)	   The	   development	   of	   an	   'information	  matrix'	   ('influence-­‐consequence'	   diagrams)	  
describing	  elements	  relevant	  to	  the	  known	  and	  expected	  behaviour	  of	  the	  GMO	  in	  
the	   release	   environment.	   These	   matrices,	   created	   by	   the	   assessment	   team,	  
describe	   the	   'operational	   landscape'	   in	   which	   a	   release	   will	   occur.	   They	   are	  
designed	   to	   contextualise	   both	   known	   and	   potential	   GMO	   behaviour	   with	   the	  
complexity	  of	  the	  release	  ecosystem.	  Their	  purpose	  is	  to	  increase	  the	  potential	  for	  
uncovering	   unexpected	   impacts	   and	   identify	   gaps	   in	   proponent	   research	  
material.7	  	  
	  
(4)	   The	   emphasis	   of	   ongoing	   monitoring	   for	   impacts	   over	   time	   and.	   space	   in	   both	  
human	   and	   biological	   targets	   and	   the	   linking	   relevant	   impact	   data	   to	   existing	  
public	  health	  sentinel	  systems	  and	  environmental	  quality	  reporting	  systems.	  	  
 
The	  goals	  of	  the	  framework	  are	  the	  anticipation	  of	  GMO	  behaviour	  through	  time	  and	  space	  and	  over	  
a	   range	   of	   ecological	   levels	   of	   Organisation	   and	   ensure	   that	   proponent	  material	   is	   of	   the	   highest	  
quality	   achievable.	   The	   achievement	   of	   this	   goal	  minimises	   the	   uncertainties	   inherent	   in	   decisions	  
about	   the	   risk	   from	  biotechnology	  and	  maximises	   the	   likelihood	  of	  ensuring	  not	  only	   the	   safety	  of	  
that	  technology	  but	  its	  acceptance	  by	  the	  public	  at	  large.	  	  
	  
Comparison	  of	  GMAC	  Risk	  Assessment	  methodology	  with	  the	  Risk	  Management	  Decision	  Making	  
framework	  
	  
The	   approach	   taken	  by	  GMAC	   in	  GMO	  assessment	   involves	   two	  phases:	   (1)	  work	   carried	   out	   by	   a	  
proponent	   that	   is	   supervised	   by	   the	   resident	   Institutional	   Biosafety	   Committee	   (IBC)	   and	   (2)	   an	  
appraisal	   of	   the	   findings	   of	   proponent	   research	   by	   both	  GMAC's	   scientific	   sub-­‐	   committee	   and	   its	  
planned	  release	  sub-­‐committee	  (GMAC,	  1993).	  	  	  
	  
GMAC	   requires	   that	  proponent	  proposals	   address	  a	  number	  of	   specific	  questions.	   These	  questions	  
are	   categorised	   from	   A	   to	   M.	   	   Questions	   in	   category	   A	   refer	   to	   'core'	   questions	   that	   must	   be	  
addressed	  in	  the	  release	  proposal	  with	  questions	  B	  to	  M	  answered	  depending	  on	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  
proposal	  (GMAC,	  1993:11).	  	  The	  rationale	  for	  these	  questions	  is	  based	  in	  part	  on	  research	  carried	  out	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Table	  1:	  Stages	  and	  Elements	  of	  the	  Risk	  Management	  Decision	  Making	  Framework	  	  
	  
Operational	  Process	   Decision	  Process	   Outcome	  
	  

























• Medical	  Geographer	  
	  
• Identify	  those	  aspects	  of	  the	  genetic	  change	  
and/or	  GMO	  that	  maybe	  hazardous	  (dangerous)	  
• Define	  any	  possible	  threat(s)	  that	  exists	  to	  the	  
planned	  release	  environment	  and/or	  humans	  
from	  use	  of	  the	  technology	  
• Characteristics	  of	  the	  GMO	  or	  technology	  that	  





• Duration,	  intensity	  &	  range	  over	  which	  use	  could	  
occur.	  (Define	  the	  'operational	  Landscape')	  
• Frequency	  of	  exposure	  -­‐	  use	  -­‐	  persistence.	  
[Viability	  of	  GMO,	  transmission	  vector,	  ICPI]	  
• Likelihood	  of	  expected	  &	  unexpected	  impacts	  or	  
GMO	  behaviour	  
• Conditions	  enhancing	  expected	  &	  unexpected	  
impacts	  or	  GMO	  behaviour	  (ie.	  changes	  in	  pest	  
susceptibility	  over	  time)	  
• Conditions	  reducing	  foreseeable	  impacts	  	  
• Evaluation	  of	  proponent	  exposure	  assessment	  	  
• Identification	  and	  description	  of	  assessment	  
endpoints	  (impact	  parameters	  &	  stress-­‐response	  
relationships)	  
	  
Reject	  or	  Limit	  
Planned	  Release	  
	  
Delay	  Planned	  Release	  
	  
• Return	  to	  proponent(s)	  
for	  changes	  and	  re-­‐
submission	  
(Existing	  plan	  too	  hazardous)	  
	  
• Seek	  opinion(s)	  of	  
external	  specialists	  not	  


















Suggested	  Participants:	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
• Facilitator	  
(Generalist)	  




• Biochemists	  	  	  	  	  
• Geneticists	  
	  
• Scope,	  nature	  and	  significance	  of	  potential	  
impacts.	  (ie.	  effect	  on	  ecosystem)	  
• How	  much	  use	  (exposure)	  -­‐>	  significant	  impact	  on	  
environment	  and/or	  human	  health	  status.	  	  
• Measurement	  of	  assessment	  endpoints	  	  













	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Suggested	  Participants	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
• Facilitator	  
(Generalist)	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
• Risk	  Analyst	  	  	  
• Demographers	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
• Epidemiologists	  
• Medical	  Geographers	  	  	  
• Policy	  Analysts	  	  
• Land-­‐use	  Planners	  	  	  	  
• Public	  Health	  
Specialists	  	  	  
• Economists	  
• Ethicist	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  
• Define	  socially	  acceptable	  risk	  criteria	  for	  
application	  of	  the	  technology	  	  	  	  
• Define	  and	  value	  impacts:	  
- Human	  health	  	  	  	  	  
- Primary,	  secondary	  &	  tertiary	  impacts	  	  
- Land	  use	  changes	  	  	  
- Demographic	  analysis	  of	  potential	  impactees	  	  	  	  	  
- Evaluate	  possible	  impacts	  against	  socially	  
acceptable	  risk	  criteria	  &	  environmental	  
endpoints	  
- Balance	  regulatory	  goals	  against	  potential	  
health	  &	  environmental	  impacts	  	  	  




Reject	  or	  Delay	  Planned	  
Release	  Participants	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  
• Return	  to	  proponents)	  for	  
changes	  and	  re-­‐submission	  
- Excessive	  potential	  for	  
unacceptable	  impacts	  
- Control	  procedures	  not	  
adequate	  for	  release	  	  	  
• Seek	  opinion(s)	  of	  external	  
specialists	  not	  represented	  
on	  the	  review	  panel	  	  
	  
Approval	  for	  next	  stage	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Operational	  Process	   Decision	  Process	   Outcome	  
Impact	  Control	  
	  
Suggested	  Participants	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
• Facilitator	  
(Generalist)	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
• Environmental	  
engineers	  	  	  
• Medical	  sociologists	  
• Agricultural	  Scientists	  
• Microbiologists	  	  	  
• Biochemists	  	  
• Biotechnologists	  	  	  	  
• Policy	  Analysts	  
• Specialist	  ecologists	  
• Industry	  
Representatives	  
• Define	  scope	  and	  type	  of	  appraisal	  and	  
monitoring	  required	  for	  the	  release	  	  	  
• Identify	  means	  to	  reduce	  impacts	  	  	  
• Identification	  of	  suitable	  impact	  control	  
mechanisms	  	  	  	  	  	  
- Bio-­‐engineering	  	  
- Behavioural	  	  	  
- Economic	  	  	  
- Social	  
• Analyse	  policy	  responses	  to	  impact	  scenarios	  	  
Allow	  planned	  release	  
	  
• If	  potential	  impacts	  are	  
considered	  acceptable	  
against	  environmental	  and	  
social	  criteria	  
• If	  adequate	  monitoring	  





Suggested	  Participants	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
• Facilitator	  
(Generalist)	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
• Biochemists	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
• Microbiologists	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
• Ecologists	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
• Geneticists	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
• Industry	  
Representatives	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
• Health	  Authority	  
Reps.	  	  
• NHMRC	  
Representatives	  	  	  
• CEPA	  Representatives	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  
• Ongoing	  surveillance	  of	  release	  areas	  (Industrial	  
and	  agricultural	  use)	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
• Interface	  with	  existing	  (or	  planned)	  
environmental	  	  
• Monitoring	  of	  impact	  on	  native	  flora,	  fauna	  &	  
related	  ecosystems	  	  
• Interface	  with	  exiting	  (or	  planned)	  environmental	  
quality	  reporting	  systems	  and	  public	  health	  
sentinel	  systems	  
• If	  monitoring	  –	  surveillance	  mechanisms	  identify	  
unexpected	  impacts	  or	  emergent	  concern	  then	  
re-­‐examine	  earlier	  operational	  processes	  	  
	  
	  
• Detection	  of	  
unanticipated	  impacts	  on	  
human	  health	  status	  or	  
environmental	  quality	  
	  
• Referral	  of	  incidents	  to	  
relevant	  authorities	  
                                                                 
Table	  2	  displays	  a	  relevant	  selection	  of	  the	  'questions	  for	  proponents'	  required	  by	  GMAC	  categorised	  
under	  the	  headings	  defined	  in	  the	  auditing	  template.	  It	  is	  evident	  that	  the	  majority	  of	  the	  questions	  
relate	  to	  'hazard	  identification'	  and	  'exposure	  (use)	  assessment'	  with	  few	  addressing	  the	  latter	  stages	  
of	   the	   template.	   	   	  While	   GMAC's	   questions	   are	   extremely	   relevant	   and	   appropriate,	   their	   narrow	  
focus	  is	  a	  limitation.	  	  
	  
Table	  2:	  	  GMAC	  'Questions	  for	  Proponents'	  categorized	  into	  Risk	  Auditing	  Template	  headings.	  	  
	  
RMDM	  Template	   Questions	  for	  Proponents	  (GMAC,	  1993)	  
Hazard	  Identification	  
&	  Characterisation	  
A1	  A2	  A11	  A3	  A16	  A33	  A27	  A23	  A4	  M2	  M3	  A13	  A12	  E4	  A14	  A15	  
A16	  A17	  A33	  A13	  
Exposure	  (Use	  
Assessment)	  
A18	  A19	  A20	  A21	  A22	  A5	  A6	  A17	  C5	  K5	  K6	  K7	  K8	  B1	  C4	  C6	  C8	  
C10	  A24	  A7	  A8	  A9	  A10	  K1	  K2	  K3	  K4	  B2	  C1	  B3	  B4	  B5	  B6	  B7	  B8	  B9	  
B10	  B11	  C11	  B12	  B13	  B14	  C9	  A25	  A26	  A28	  C7	  
Risk	  Estimation	   A32	  A34	  
Risk	  Evaluation	   	  
Impact	  Control	   A29	  
Impact	  Monitoring	   A30	  A13(iii)	  
A:	  	  Core	  Questions	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
K:	  	  Organisms	  for	  biological	  control	  B:	  Plants	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
M:	  	  Organisms	  as	  food	  	  
C:	  	  Micro-­‐organisms	  (not	  D	  or	  E)	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This	  weakness	  derives	  from	  an	  over	  emphasis	  on	  hazard	  identification	  and	  exposure	  issues	  in	  the	  risk	  
methodology	  used	  by	  Tiedje	  et	  al.,	   (1989).	   	   	  This	   limitation	  was	  translated	   into	  the	  risk	  assessment	  
factors	   recommended	   to	   proponents	   (GMAC,	   1993:43-­‐46).	   	   As	   a	   result,	   GMAC's	   approach	   to	   risk	  
assessment	   generates	   minimal	   information	   about	   either	   risk	   estimation	   and	   evaluation	   or	   impact	  
control	  and	  monitoring.	  	  
	  
Evaluation	  of	  GMAC's	  risk	  assessment	  of	  the	  Insertion	  of	  a	  Bt	  gene	  into	  cotton	  Plants	  	  
	  
Details	   of	   GMAC's	   risk	   assessment	   of	   transgenic	   cotton	   plants	   are	   drawn	   from	   Planning	   Release	  
Proposal	   Public	   Information	   Sheets	   PR-­‐20	   &	   36.	   This	  material	   tends	   to	   emphasise	   what	   has	   been	  
done	  correctly'	  whereas	  the	  more	  rigorously	  structured	  RMDM	  framework	  considers	  'what	  could	  go	  
wrong'	  and	  therefore,	   'what	  needs	  to	  be	  done.'	   	  Table	  3	  summarises	  both	  GMAC's	   risk	  assessment	  
and	  recommendations	  as	  listed	  in	  report	  PR-­‐36	  (pp.	  73-­‐74)	  under	  the	  RMDM	  framework	  categories.	  	  
	  
While	   Table	   3	   does	   show	   that	   GMAC's	   risk	   assessment	   addressed	   a	   number	   of	   important	   issues,	  
details	   in	   report	  PR736	   seem	  disjointed	  and	   incomplete	  when	  compared	   to	   the	  decision	  processes	  
defined	   in	   the	   RMDM	   framework.	   Further,	   a	   number	   of	   statements	   about	   specific	   impact	   issues	  
appear	   to	   be	   unsubstantiated	   (See	   notes	   a-­‐b	   in	   Table	   3).	   Although	   the	   report	   fails	   to	   address	   the	  
RMDM	   framework	   category	   of	   'Impact	   Monitoring,'	   it	   does	   make,	   very	   useful	   recommendations	  
under	   the	   'Impact	   Control'	   heading.	   	   	   Unfortunately	   the	   report	   does	   not	   indicate	   whether	   these	  
actions	  were	  implemented	  in	  the	  field	  trial.	  GMAC	  findings	  as	  set	  out	  in	  report	  PR-­‐36	  do	  not	  reflect	  
the	  technical	  level	  of	  assessment	  that	  must	  have	  been	  completed	  by	  both	  proponents	  and	  their	  own	  
scientific	  sub-­‐committee	  and	  its	  planned	  release	  sub-­‐committee.	  	  
	  
A	  further	  omission	  is	  a	  critical	  evaluation	  of	  the	  design	  of	  the	  field	  trial	  itself.	  The	  UW	  is	  supposed	  to	  
provide	   data	   to	   assist	   the	   decision-­‐making	   process	   for	   later	   proposals	   of	   a	   similar	   type,	   whether	  
large-­‐scale	   or	   commercial	   releases.	   Field	   trials	   are	   at	   best,	   quasi-­‐experimental	   designs	   (ie.	   not	   all	  
dependent	   variables	   can	  be	   controlled	  by	   the	  experimenter)	   (Kamil,	   1988).	   Trial	   designs	   should	  be	  
therefore	   be	   carefully	   and	   rigorously	   evaluated	   for	   internal	   and	   external	   validity	   (Kamil,	   1988;	  
Robson,	  1993).	  	  Other	  pieces	  of	  information	  that	  should	  form	  the	  basis	  of	  decisions	  about	  the	  release	  
of	  GMO's	  are	  missing	  from	  GMAC's	  risk	  assessment.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  
Table	  3:	   GMAC	  Risk	  Assessment	  Findings	  contrasted	  with	  Risk	  Management	  Decision	  Making	  
Template	  	  
	  




• Insecticidal	  toxin	  proteins	  
• Host	  specificity	  &	  mammalian	  toxicity	  of	  CryllA	  a	  
• Specificity	  of	  toxin	  effects	  narrow	  range	  of	  insects.	  




• Large-­‐scale	  use	  of	  Bt	  may	  lead	  to	  resistance	  in	  insect	  pests.	  	  
• Emergence	  of	  secondary	  insect	  pest	  species.	  	  
• Effects	  on	  beneficial	  and	  opportunistic	  insect	  species.	  	  
• Transfer	  to	  cotton	  relatives	  or	  other	  cotton	  plants	  b	  
• Disarmed	  virulence	  and	  tumorigenic	  functions	  of	  bacterial	  vector.	  	  
Risk	  Estimation	  
	  
• Likelihood	  of	  transfer	  to	  cotton	  relatives	  is	  low	  
(Incompatible	  genome:	  Isolated	  distribution:	  different	  breeding	  systems)	  
Risk	  Evaluation	  
	  
• No	  threat	  to	  human	  health	  or	  other	  animals.	  	  
• No	  members	  of	  Gossypium	  spp.	  known	  to	  be	  weeds	  in	  Australia.	  	  
• Scale	  of	  trial	  too	  small	  to	  be	  of	  concern	  (re:	  Development	  of	  resistance	  in	  
target	  species	  and	  other	  effects	  on	  insect	  populations).	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RMDM	  Template	   GMAC	  Risk	  Assessment	  	  (GMAC	  Report	  PR-­‐36)	  
Impact	  Control:	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  
• Spray	  one	  plot	  with	  insecticides	  to	  control	  insect	  pests	  and	  minimise	  possible	  pollen	  
dispersal	  by	  insects;	  other	  plot	  not	  sprayed.	  	  
• Trial	  site	  should	  be	  surrounded	  by	  buffer	  zone	  of	  unmodified	  cotton	  to	  act	  as	  a	  pollen	  
trap.	  GR	  
• Separate	  trial	  plot	  from	  other	  cotton	  plants	  by	  >	  50	  m.	  GR	  
• After	  trial,	  wheat	  will	  be	  sown	  in	  field	  to	  suppress	  cotton	  volunteers.	  	  
• After	  harvest	  of	  wheat,	  cultivate	  and	  spray	  field	  with	  residual	  herbicide	  and	  leave	  
fallow	  for	  nine	  months.	  Any	  cotton	  plants	  in	  the	  field	  destroyed.	  
• If	  intending	  to	  market	  lint	  from	  transgenic	  or	  buffer	  zone	  plants,	  GMAC	  needs	  
evidence	  that	  the	  lint	  does	  not	  contain	  seed	  or	  Bt	  protein.	  GR	  	  	  
• All	  seed	  not	  used	  in	  later	  trials	  will	  be	  destroyed,	  GMAC	  requires	  certificate	  of	  seed	  
destruction.	  GR	  
• Arrangement	  for	  transport	  of	  cotton	  seed	  to	  and	  from	  release	  site	  should	  comply	  
with	  packaging,	  labelling	  and	  transport	  requirements	  set	  by	  GMAC	  in	  its	  guidelines.	  
GR	  
Impact	  Monitoring:	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  e	  
	  
GR	  	   GMAC	  Recommended	  Action.	  	  
a	   GMAC	  states	  that	  this	  information	  was	  requested	  from	  proponent.	  Toxicity	  data	  does	  not	  however,	  
appear	  in	  the	  report.	  	  
b	   GMAC	  did	  not	  consider	  any	  other	  means	  of	  transfer	  besides	  outcrossing'.	  vector	  transmission	  eg.	  virus,	  
bacteria?	  	  
c	   Unsubstantiated.	  	  
d	   No	  consideration	  of	  other	  plant	  species	  as	  potential	  hosts.	  	  
e	   No	  government	  regulation	  of	  chronic	  or	  emergent	  impact;	  no	  independent	  third	  party	  monitoring	  eg.	  	  
CEPA	  or	  State	  Government	  agencies.	  
	  
For	  example	  there	  is	  no	  attempt	  to	  describe	  the	  complex	  ecological	  web	  that	  exists	  either	  in	  a	  trial	  or	  
in	   commercial	   release	   (the	   RN4DM	   framework	   requires	   an	   in-­‐depth	   analysis	   of	   the	   operational	  
landscape'	  of	   the	  GMO).	  Also,	   conditions	  enhancing	   expected	  and/or	  unexpected	   impacts	  or	  GMO	  
behaviour	  have	  not	  been	  fully	  considered.	  The	  disjointed	  nature	  of	  the	  information	  as	  presented	  and	  
the	  lack	  of	  coverage	  on	  the	  wider	  issues	  make	  GMAC's	  report	  of	  its	  risk	  assessment	  unconvincing.	  	  
	  
An	  example:	  Bee	  behaviour	  in	  the	  test	  site.	  	  
	  
A	  problem	  that	  GMAC	  has	  not	  adequately	  addressed	  is	  the	  dispersal	  of	  hazards	  and	  their	  source	  from	  
the	  experimental	   plot	   to	  other	   locations	   (now	  b	   in	   Table	  3).	  An	  example	  of	   this	   is	   the	  dispersal	   of	  
novel	   genes	  by	  bees	   (as	   a	   transmission	   vector).	  GMAC	   required	   the	  proponents	   to	   set	  up	  a	  buffer	  
zone	  around	  the	  transgenic	  plants	   to	  act	  as	  a	  pollen	  trap.	  This	   is	  a	  precaution	  that	   the	  proponents	  
had	   taken	   in	   earlier	   field	   trials	   (eg.	   PR-­‐20).	   However,	   this	   design	   requirement	   seems	   based	   on	   a	  
number	  of	  assumptions	  about	  bee	  behaviour:	  	  
	  
(1)	  That	  given	  the	  variety	  of	  combinations	  of	  visitations	  by	  bees	  to	  either	  the	  buffer	  zone	  or	  the	  
transgenic	  plants	  (figure	  3	  points	  1-­‐4),	  bees	  will	  visit	  the	  transgenic	  conon	  enough	  for	  transgenic	  
pollen	  to	  be	  detectable	  in	  the	  buffer	  zone	  (see	  Figure	  3,	  point	  4).	  	  
	  
(2)	  'Mat	  bees	  returning	  to	  the	  hive	  do	  not	  stop	  and	  visit	  any	  other	  plants.	  	  
	  
(3)	   'Mat	  bees	  are	   cleaned	   thoroughly	   at	   the	  hive	   so	  no	   transgenic	  pollen	   remains	  on	   them	  and	  
therefore	  not	  available	  to	  pollinate	  plants	  at	  other	  sites	  they	  visit.	  	  
	  
All	  of	  these	  assumptions	  are	  scientifically	  confirmable,	  but	  there	  is	  no	  evidence	  that	  GMAC	  evaluated	  
the	   assumptions	   on	   which	   the	   buffer	   zone	   requirements	   were	   based.	   In	   other	   words,	   GMAC's	  
procedures	   seem	   to	   lack	   the	   quality	   control	   essential	   to	   engender	   confidence	   in	   the	   execution	   of	  
those	  procedures.	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Why	  the	  RMDM	  framework	  is	  an	  evolutionary	  Improvement	  	  
	  
The	   RMDM	   framework	   is	   designed	   to	   promote	   quality	   assurance	   in	   both	   scientific	   rigour	   and	  
regulatory	  practice.	  It	  seeks	  this	  in	  a	  number	  of	  ways:	  	  
	  
• By	  defining	  a	  theoretical	  framework	  that	  clearly	  states	  the	  type	  of	  decisions	  that	  need	  to	  be	  
made	  to	  ensure	  effective	  risk	  analysis.	  	  
• By	   using	   an	   auditing	   template	   that	   defines	   the	   order	   in	   which	   such	   regulatory	   decisions	  
should	  be	  made.	  	  
• By	  requiring	  that	  clearly	  defined	  and	  measurable	  ecological	  endpoints	  be	  used	  as	  indicators	  
of	  the	  potential	  impacts	  being	  assessed.	  	  
• By	   requiring	   -­‐that	   each	   phase	   of	   the	   risk	   audit	   template	   be	   carried	   out	   by	   'groups'	   of	  
assessors	  whose	  combined	  expertise	  can	  adequately	  deal	  with	  the	  complexity	  inherent	  in	  the	  
decision	  processes	  and	  the	  ecological	  complexity	  into	  which	  a	  release	  win	  occur.8	  
	  
The	   implementation	   of	   such	   a	   risk-­‐based	   framework	   would	   not	   only	   add	   clarity	   to	   the	   tasks	   of	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1	  This	  contention	  has	  very	  wide	  support	  in	  the	  risk	  analysis	  and	  risk	  communication	  literature.	  See	  for	  example:	  
	  
2	   'Management	   in	   this	   sense	   should	   be	   understood	   as	   a	   proactive	   and	   anticipatory	   process	   that	   seeks	   to	  
identify	   instances	   of	   harm	   from	   products	   that	   previously	   may	   not	   have	   been	   documented.	   This	   again	  
differentiates	  between	  established	  notions	  of-­‐impact	  analysis	  where	  the	  accent	  is	  often	  on	  preventing	  known	  
harm,	  and	  risk	  analysis	  that	  has	  a	  much	  wider	  scope	  (see,	  Levidow	  and	  Tait	  1992:93).	  
	  
3	  Owing	  to	  different	  usage	  of	  hazard	  and	  risk	  terminology	  within	  professions	  and	  disciplines,	  a	  standardised	  set	  
of	  definitions	  drawn	  from	  existing	  literature	  is	  presented	  here.	  Because	  the	  RMDMS	  framework	  is	  intended	  to	  
function	  as	  a	  generalised	  assessment	   'template'	  the	  following	   'definitions	  are	  applicable:	  Hazard:	  An	  event	  or	  
factor	   possessing	   the	   ability	   to	   cause	   or	   contribute	   to	   harm	  or	   undesirable	   effect	   to	   life	   or	   things	   following	  
contact	  with	  it	  or	  use	  of	  it;	  Risk:	  A	  measure	  of	  the	  potential	  for	  harm	  or	  deleterious	  impact	  resulting	  from	  direct	  
or	   indirect	   contact	   with	   a	   hazard	   or	   hazardous	   event.	   This	   term	   can	   be	   expressed	   either	   quantitatively	   or	  
qualitatively	  with	  equal	  validity,	  Impact:	  An	  outcome	  following	  exposure	  to	  a	  hazard	  which	  can	  be	  gauged	  in	  a	  
variety	  of	  environmental	  compartments,	  human	  physiological	  systems	  or	  population-­‐based	  health	  statistics	  and	  
manifest	  in	  many	  disparate	  ways	  with	  varying	  frequencies,	  magnitudes	  and	  latencies	  (See:	  Barnes,	  1994a:76).	  
	  
4	  Krewski	  &	  Birkwood	  (1987),	  present	  a	  range	  of	  risk	  analysis	  models	  many	  with	  conflicting	  use	  of	  terminology	  
and	  purpose.	  	  	  
	  
5	  The	  notion	  of	  'transparency'	  is	  important	  with	  respect	  to	  enhancing	  public	  trust	  and	  confidence	  in	  regulatory	  
decisions	  and	  the	  wider	  issue	  of	  risk	  communication.	  	  
	  
6	   The	   GENHAZ	   protocol	   from	   the	   UK	   also	   suggests	   the	   involvement	   of	   a	   team	   of	   assessors	   with	   varying	  
expertise	  matched	  to	  type	  of	  GMO	  and	  or	  the	  release	  environment.	  The	  RMDM	  framework	  team	  selection	  can	  
also	  vary	  in	  this	  way	  but	  includes	  consideration	  of	  the	  decisions	  being	  made	  in	  a	  given	  phase	  of	  audit	  trail.	  (See,	  
Royal	  Commission	  on	  Environmental	  Pollution	  (1991)	  GENHAZ.	  A	  System	  for	  the	  Critical	  Appraisal	  of	  Proposals	  
to	  Release	  Genetically	  Modified	  Organisms	  into	  the	  Environment,	  Report	  14.)	  
	  
7	  This	  methodology	  is	  derived	  from	  aspects	  of	  landscape	  ecology	  and	  landscape	  epidemiology.	  	  
	  
8	  This	  is	  an	  example	  of	  the	  'Law	  of	  Requisite	  Variety'	  (Ashby,	  1956)	  as	  it	  manifests	  within	  group	  decision	  making	  
(Weick	  1987:116).	  	  
	  
